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Abstract
Parents’ transfer motives are important for understanding, e.g., macroecono-
mics, income (re)distribution, savings, and public finance. Using data from
six biennial waves of the Health and Retirement Study 1992–2002, we es-
timate grouped tobit-type latent variable models with multi-level error com-
ponents. First, we find that inter vivos transfers from parents to children are
gifts, and not temporary help to overcome liquidity constraints. Second, inter
vivos gifts are compensatory in the sense that life-time poorer children will
receive higher transfers than their life-time richer siblings. Third, inter vivos
gifts do not, however, make up the entire difference in life-time incomes.
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1 Introduction
Parents intentionally, but also unintentionally, make transfers to their children in
different ways. There are biological transfers of natural talents and abilities. Pur-
chases of education and other human capital investments, for example providing
access to social networks, are other ways of making transfers. Parents can also
transfer financial and tangible property by bequests and inter vivos gifts.
The objective of this paper is to find out what determines parents’ inter vivos
transfers to their children. In the data, many parents do not transfer at all, and many
children do not receive at all even when their siblings do. The observed pattern of
transfers is related to characteristics of both the child and the parent. An important
question is if parental transfers are compensatory, i.e., if parents transfer more to a
child with less resources of her own than her brothers and sisters.
Understanding the determinants of parental property transfers is crucial for a
wide range of economic issues. Some of these are the possible effects of fiscal
policy, the equality of opportunity, the determinants of savings, and the optimal
design of tax systems. In macroeconomics, for example, the Ricardian equiva-
lence predictions rest on the assumption of dynastic, altruistic, behavior. Second,
parental property transfers are also important when discussing the distribution of
income and wealth. The extent to which wealth is carried over from one genera-
tion to the next affects how equal opportunities really are. Parental transfers may
also decrease the efficiency of public redistribution by counteracting the intended
effects of public transfers.
A third field for which parental property transfers are important is savings.
Strong transfer motives will affect savings behavior. This concerns saved amounts
but also the timing of savings over the life cycle. Finally, there are also public
finance aspects of parental property transfers. Depending on the determinants of
transfer behavior, taxes on inter vivos gifts, bequests, and inheritances may or may
not create excess burdens.
The theoretical literature on parental transfers is characterized by different as-
sumptions concerning parents’ motives for making transfers. It is an empirical
question to determine which of the motives are most important.
Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers find that inter vivos gifts tend
to be compensatory. Post mortem bequests, on the other hand, are usually equally
divided.1 This difference between bequest and gift behavior is somewhat of a puz-
zle. Simple versions of altruistic models of intergenerational transfers, for exam-
ple, only predict that total transfers will be compensatory. It is an open question
whether both bequests and inter vivos gifts will be compensatory in the simple
models.
In this paper we study data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The
HRS has been designed and conducted by the University of Michigan’s Survey
1Pestieau (2003), Laferre`re and Wolff (2006), and Arrondel and Masson (2006) include surveys
of the empirical literature.
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Research Center. It is a panel data set, focusing on health and retirement related
issues of the U.S. pre-retirement population (cohorts born between 1931 and 1941).
It was launched in 1992 and is repeated biennially. We use data from six waves
1992–2002.
The HRS and the related Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) have been used in several previous empirical studies. McGarry and
Schoeni (1995) and McGarry (1999), using the first wave of the HRS, find that
gifts are compensatory in the sense that higher income of a child makes a gift less
likely. McGarry and Schoeni (1995) and McGarry (2000), the latter using the first
two waves of the HRS, find that gift amounts are compensatory. Dunn and Phillips
(1997), McGarry and Schoeni (1997), and McGarry (1999), using the first wave of
AHEAD, also find that gifts are compensatory in the sense that higher income of a
child makes a gift less likely.
We want to emphasize three features of our analysis as compared to previous
studies: First, it is essential to use data that capture variations in several dimen-
sions. The predictions of the transfer theories are predictions of the within-family-
variation in transfer behavior, not the between-family-variation. Moreover, theory
distinguishes between transfers to compensate for differences in permanent eco-
nomic resources (permanent income), inter vivos gifts, and transfers to ease tem-
porary needs (temporary liquidity constraints). Data, therefore, need to have a
family dimension, a sibling dimension, and a time dimension.
The HRS provide such data. Data (i) are on the recipient level (children), rather
than data on the donor level (parents), (ii) are for all siblings in each family, and
(iii) from several waves, and not only a single cross section. We are—to our
knowledge—the first authors to estimate transfer models exploiting the multidi-
mensional panel structure of the data. This gives us the possibility of being able to
disentangle the hypothesis of compensatory inter vivos gifts from temporary help
to children in order to ease liquidity constraints.2 This is the economic contribution
of our paper.
Second, theories about compensatory transfers are more about transfer amounts
than transfer probabilities. Most previous papers have focused on transfer proba-
bilities, while we focus on transfer amounts. Third, there are many observations
where transfers are zero, no transfer is made from parent to child. It is, therefore,
crucial to take into account that data are censored.
The main empirical innovation is that we use a limited dependent variable
model with a nested grouped error structure. We specify the unobservables to
fall into three categories: an idiosyncratic error term, varying over families, chil-
dren, and time; a child-level specific error component, varying over children within
a family and constant over time; a family-specific error component, varying over
families and constant for all children in the family (and constant over time). This
makes our model a multi-level error components model. The econometrics of lin-
2Access to several waves of panel data also allows us to estimate random effects income models
for the children. We use these estimations to compute the permanent income of each child.
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ear multi-level components with random effects is detailed in the contributions by
Antweiler (2001) and Baltagi et al. (2001). Applications include Cardoso (2000).
We include in our specification averages of variables over children, which is
inspired by the well-known Mundlak (1978) approach. This way, we hope to cap-
ture the within-variation at the family level. Mundlak has shown the equivalence of
random effects and fixed effects in a linear model when the specification includes
time-averages of regressors in a standard (one-way) panel. With this in mind, we
can interpret our estimates as emulating fixed family effects.
Our model is a nonlinear extension of this structure and estimated by Maxi-
mum Likelihood. Applications of nonlinear models and estimation issues are dis-
cussed in some detail in Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2005). We allow the idiosyncratic
error to be heteroskedastic. This has not only implications for standard errors but
also repercussions for coefficient estimates in the latent variable model due to the
nonlinearity of the model. We found that available software to estimate this model
fails to produce estimates in any reasonable time span. We, therefore, rely on our
own software which employs a simulated Maximum Likelihood estimator based
on quasi-random Monte Carlo methods. Our paper is, therefore, one of the very
few that presents estimates of a generalized tobit model with multi-level effects on
a large panel data set.
The sensitivity analysis includes not only changes in specification and samples,
but also trade off our parametric approach with the semiparametric one proposed
by Honore´ (1992) on a one-way model.
Our main findings are as follows:
1. We find that intergenerational transfers flowing from parents to children are
inter vivos gifts, not temporary help to overcome liquidity constraints.3 We
identify this by using a regressor that proxies for the potential importance of
liquidity constraints.
2. Gift amounts from parents are compensatory in the sense that life-time poorer
children will receive higher transfers than their life-time richer siblings.
3. We do not find, however, that gifts make up the entire difference in life-time
resources. One dollar less of life-time income compared to a sibling triggers
about 2 cents of expected (unconstrained) inter vivos gifts (levels model)
or an increase by 0.003 percent (semielasticity in a nonlinearly transformed
model).
The paper is structured as follows: We present and discuss in Section 2 testable
predictions from theoretical models of intergenerational transfers. Section 3 de-
scribes the data and provides some descriptive results. The estimation results are
reported in Section 4. We also present some sensitivity analyses in this section.
Section 5 concludes.
3Despite the questionnaire explicitly allowing for both types.
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2 Theoretical framework
Gifts and temporary help are voluntary intergenerational transfers. Different mo-
tives for voluntary intergenerational transfers have been proposed in the theoretical
literature. We will discuss altruistic, exchange, egoistic, and risk-sharing motives.4
Altruism. This is the Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) framework. Consider
an altruistic parent who has several children. The parent cares about her own life-
time consumption and the children’s lifetime consumption possibilities. The parent
will try to equalize the consumption possibilities of the children.5 Higher lifetime
income for a child relative to the siblings reduces the lifetime transfers received.
Higher lifetime resources for the parent leads to more transfers to all children. Sim-
ilarly, higher lifetime income for a sibling also increases the lifetime transfer to a
child.
What matters are the total resources of the other people in the family, not the
distribution within the family. A child will only get more if family lifetime re-
sources increase. The altruistic model generates an adding-up condition. If the
parent (or a sibling) gains a dollar in permanent income while a child loses the
same amount in permanent income, a one dollar gift will restore the initial optimal
allocation of resources.6
Exchange. Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) present versions of the ex-
change model. In this model, the parent values the attention of the children more
than services otherwise purchased in anonymous markets. Suppose a parent ob-
tains such attention in proportion to the amount she gives to each child. Higher
income of the parent will tend to result in more gifts (more attention purchased
from the children), but also more own consumption.
Since the opportunity cost of each child’s time is increasing in his income, the
implicit price the parent will have to pay for attention will tend to be increasing in
the child’s income. The probability that the parent makes any purchases at all will,
therefore, be decreasing in child income.
Given that the parent makes purchases (transfers), the impact of the children’s
incomes on total spending is, however, ambiguous. Suppose that the price elasticity
is low because there are no close substitutes to the services of a particular child.
The amount will then be increasing in the child’s income. If, on the other hand, the
price elasticity is high, the amount decreases in the child’s income.
Transactions costs—in the form of travel or travel time costs—suggest that
children living closer to their parents need relatively lower compensation. Par-
ent’s poor health may mean higher demand for attention or higher compensation
payments.
4See also the surveys by Laitner (1997), Masson and Pestieau (1997), Laferre`re andWolff (2006),
and Arrondel and Masson (2006).
5The stronger the parent’s altruism the more the parent wants to equalize.
6Cox (1987) is the first to calculate this derivative condition. Altonji et al. (1997) and Laitner and
Ohlsson (2001) test the condition. McGarry (2000) stresses that the condition does not necessarily
apply to current income.
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Egoism. In another frequently used model (e.g. Blinder, 1974; Andreoni, 1989;
Hurd, 1989), a parent derives utility from the amount it gives (joy of giving or warm
glow) but not from the utility the child actually derives from the resulting transfer.
This is sometimes called the egoistic model.
Compared to the altruistic model, there are no differences of the effects of
the parent’s income. The models differ in the implications of children’s incomes.
Transfer behavior according to the egoistic model is not affected by the incomes of
the children.
Risk-sharing. Transfers within families are also discussed in the literature on
risk sharing within families. Intra-family transfers may be the result of informal
insurance arrangements within the family in situations when insurance markets are
missing or when insurance markets are affected by adverse selection and moral
hazard. Usually these transfers compensate for temporary rather than permanent
income losses. Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993) discuss risk shar-
ing in the absence of insurance markets. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) study how
families provide substitutes to annuities from insurance markets.
Suppose households cannot insure because of imperfect markets for annuities.
And suppose that there is no risk-sharing within the family. Instead households
have to save for a long retirement. If they die young, their unused resources be-
come accidental bequests. If they live a long time, they may die with little or no
estate. The accidental model of Davies (1981) is a version of the life–cycle model.
Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) report rather ambivalent support for the model.
Parents can make transfers during their lifetime—inter vivos transfers. An al-
ternative is to bequeath, thus making the transfer post mortem. Why inter vivos
transfers and not bequests?
The existence of liquidity constraints may make parents choose inter vivos
transfers rather than bequests (Bernheim et al., 1985). It is difficult for children
to borrow against future inheritances because of imperfect markets and asymmet-
ric information. Parents may, on the other hand, choose to postpone transfers as
long as possible for strategic reasons (Cremer and Pestieau, 1996). The motivation
for this is to provide incentives to study and work for the children. The existence
and design of gift, estate, and inheritance taxes may affect the choice between gifts
and bequests by creating incentives for tax avoidance, see Nordblom and Ohlsson
(2006).
Simple versions of altruistic models of intergenerational transfers predict that
total transfers will be compensatory. It is an open question whether both bequests
and inter vivos gifts will be compensatory in these models. The empirical findings
are that inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory while bequests usually are equally
divided among heirs. Can this be given a theoretical basis?
Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) assume that gifts are private information while
bequests are public information and that parents care about their reputation after
death. Given these assumptions altruistic parents will choose compensatory gifts
and equal bequests. Bernheim and Severinov (2003) also discuss theoretical mod-
els that generate results consistent with the empirical evidence.
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3 Data and descriptives
3.1 Data
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which follows the 1992
pre-retirement cohort (born during 1931–1941) through time into retirement and
beyond. The sampled population covers U.S. residents excluding institutionalized
persons households. The core sample aims to be representative, although there
is deliberate oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents. Not every
household has children, and we shall focus on the ones that do. We use the first six
waves (1992–2002) of final release biennial surveys.
Within a household there are two main respondent types: the household fi-
nancial respondent and the family respondent, the latter usually being the female
member in a couple. Apart from family structure and transfers, the questionnaire
covers the demographic background, health status, housing, employment, last job
and job history, retirement plans, assets and liabilities, income, and information on
children.
The family respondent provides information on children and transfers. Child
demographics extend to sex, age, education etc. of all children of the family. In-
ter vivos money transfers relate to flows from parents to their children during the
preceding years.
We have expended large efforts at checking, and where necessary, imputing
information from adjacent years for child level background variables. Since house-
hold composition may change over time, both at the parental and the child level,
we make sure that we keep constant the source of information on each child over
time. More information on how we tailored the data to our needs is available in
Appendix A.
We start with all children observed in the families of all HRS households in any
of the six waves 1992–2002. Children are defined as being children of the family
respondent and/or the spouse, excluding grandchildren, spouses of children, or
other unrelated household members. We exclude additional mentions of children
that were mentioned only after the first waves, unless they enter the household
via family restructuring (or birth). For instance, in some cases new children are
introduced into an existing household simply by a new spouse with children of his
or her own entering.
There are 108,635 observations in total. The data structure allows identifica-
tion of child-level variables through more than one respondent in the case that an
original 1992-household split and both split-off households report on a common
child. These duplicate interviews is what we call ‘family stories’ and we iden-
tify the person from whom a particular ‘family story’ originates in a given sample
wave.7 We then select one ‘family story’ for each child, which ensures that the
reporting person stays constant over time. This leaves 102,827 observations. We
measure as parent-level variables the characteristics of the reporting person (or the
7See Appendix A for details.
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Table 1: Number of families and children
wave 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 any
families 4,499 4,456 4,721 4,828 4,886 4,843 5,210
children 15,795 15,958 17,161 17,760 18,089 18,064 20,033
household that this person lives in when variables are measured at the household
level). Table 1 provides a count of families with children in the data where inter-
view information was available.
The HRS data set has a number of important strengths.8 There is relatively
little attrition at the parent level. At the child level there is close to no attrition and,
therefore, no selection because parents provide the information on all children.
Couples in the sampled generation display relatively high marital stability, and the
number of children in each family is fixed in many cases. In addition, parents
will have accumulated relatively much wealth, and are at a point in their life cycle
where they need to decide how to spend it.
For the present study, the information on inter vivos transfers is of crucial im-
portance. To illustrate, in the first wave, respondents are asked the following ques-
tion (verbatim quote):
(Not counting any shared housing or shared food,) Have you [and your
(husband/partner)] given (your child/any of your children) financial
assistance totaling $500 or more in the past 12 months?
[DEFINITION: By financial assistance we mean giving money, help-
ing pay bills, or covering specific types of costs such as those for med-
ical care or insurance, schooling, down payment for a home, rent, etc.
The financial assistance can be considered support, a gift or a loan.]
If the answer is affirmative, the respondent is then asked to give the total
amounts transferred, per child. In those cases where parents are unable to give
dollar amounts, static and unfolding bracketing techniques have been employed
over the years to elicit the magnitudes.
There are two changes in wording in these questions over the years. In the
second wave, the reporting threshold is lowered from $500 to $100, but restored to
$500 again in the third wave. In regression analyses, survey wave dummies will
8The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is often used in the inter vivos transfer literature,
for example by Altonji et al. (1992, 1997). PSID, however, only has a single cross section of transfer
information, making it impossible to distinguish the risk-sharing hypothesis from implications of
other transfer models. HRS families have more children than the PSID families. The National
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) have also used to study inter vivos transfers, see, for example, Light
and McGarry (2003). Both PSID and NLS may also suffer from (non-random) attrition at the child
level, since children households are separately interviewed and then matched to parent interviews
(Fitzgerald et al., 1998). The NLS, in addition, will not be representative for parent–children matches
due to selection on birth cohort sampling for both generations (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).
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Table 2: Transfer incidence, made and received
transfers by number of waves, percent:
none 1 2 3 4 5 6 total
family level, made 24.60 17.89 15.82 14.26 12.40 8.98 6.04 100
child level, received 56.46 17.77 10.31 6.91 4.80 2.57 1.18 100
Note. Weighted statistics.
capture much of the difference in definitions. Forcing a $500 dollar threshold on
to wave-2 information also turned out to be immaterial for our results.
From the third wave onwards, parents are requested to mention all transfers
made over the last two years. In particular the latter will have an effect on the
measured amount of transfers made, as shown below in the summary statistics. In
regression analyses, we shall divide all transfer amounts by 2 for those interviews
where a 2-year horizon applied. We convert all monetary values (income, wealth,
and transfers) to 1991 dollars.
For descriptive statistics we impute missing values for transfer amounts, con-
ditional on parents reporting that amounts were given, and conditional on available
bracket information. We avoid using imputed values on transfer amounts in most
of our empirical analyses in Section 4 where possible. We use imputed values
for income and wealth throughout. Our measure of permanent income is likewise
unobserved in the data (see Appendix C for details).
3.2 Descriptives
The data set has two dimensions that are of particular importance for our study:
variation within a family between children, and variation for a given child over
time. Table 2 displays transfer incidence reflecting these two dimensions. A quarter
of all families never made any transfers during the entire observation period. More
than half of all children never received any transfers. We count 18 percent of
families making a transfer once and 6 percent making transfers each wave. 18
percent of children are reported to have received a transfer in one wave during our
observation period, 1 percent is reported to have been receiving between every pair
of waves. The pattern is consistent with families targeting transfers at particular
children in a particular year.
Table 3 shows that 39 percent of the families gave in 1992 while 17 percent
of the children received gifts. The corresponding numbers for 1996 are of very
similar magnitude, while the incidences are higher in the 1994 wave. The amounts
given and received are, however, slightly lower in 1994 compared to 1992. Due to
the change in wording of the questionnaire, we find substantially larger amounts
reported in the 1996 wave. Over all years, there is an increasing trend in transfer
amounts as the parental generation ages. It appears that giving becomes more
selective, as children become less likely to be recipients.
Table 4 cross-tabulates the number of children reported on in the family against
8
Table 3: Transfers made and received, per wave
wave 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
incidence:
family level mean 0.39 0.52 0.44 0.38 0.37 0.34
median 0 1 0 0 0 0
child level mean 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.14
median 0 0 0 0 0 0
amounts:
family level, mean 2,008 2,030 3,439 2,431 2,534 2,737
unconditional median 0 141 0 0 0 0
conditional mean 5,185 3,939 7,897 6,480 6,874 8,101
median 2,500 1,414 3,352 2,970 2,453 2,692
child level, mean 585 579 967 679 703 749
unconditional median 0 0 0 0 0 0
conditional mean 3,424 2,409 4,714 3,915 4,360 5,401
median 1,700 943 1,787 1,697 1,635 1,615
Note. Weighted statistics. Amounts are in 1991 dollars.
Conditional: statistics obtained on sample with only positive transfer amounts.
the number and fraction of parents who have given financial assistance, per wave.
For families with two or more children, this fraction is decreasing in the number
of children. Conditional on giving anything at all, a fraction of parents with more
than one child gives the same amount to all children. Equal sharing is decreasing
in the number of children. Around a fifth of the parents with two children give
equally whereas only about 3 percent of the parents with more than four children
give the same amounts. It is perhaps interesting to note that equal sharing appears
to increase over time for 2- and 3- child families (while the parental generation
ages). Allowing for some intrafamily variation does not substantially change the
picture.
Table 5 suggests that not only are richer parents more likely to give at all, but
also that higher net worth increases the likelihood of equal giving.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Estimation
Let us first introduce some notation: x is a vector of regressors, y is the observed
outcome of interest (transfers from parents to child). The data vary in three dimen-
sions: there are families (or, households), indexed h, at the outermost level. Within
a given family, there are potentially many children, indexed k. For each child,
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Table 4: Fractions of families giving and giving equally.
number of families
number of children 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
1 all 441 401 430 434 428 424
% giving 33.7 51.7 42.3 34.3 33.5 27.4
% giving equally — — — — — —
—, ±20%a — — — — — —
2 all 1,190 1,145 1,188 1,192 1,195 1,167
% giving 41.0 54.0 47.5 40.6 41.5 38.8
% giving equally 11.3 14.9 19.8 19.5 19.1 24.5
—, ±20%a 16.7 20.8 24.4 25.0 23.4 27.2
3 all 1,020 1,002 1,041 1,077 1,082 1,076
% giving 39.9 51.5 45.0 39.6 37.7 37.7
% giving equally 3.5 3.1 8.2 10.7 13.0 12.1
—, ±20%a 4.7 3.7 9.5 11.7 13.5 12.6
4 all 768 786 824 830 855 832
% giving 40.7 52.3 44.4 37.4 36.5 31.9
% giving equally 1.7 3.0 5.7 7.1 9.1 6.5
—, ±20%a 1.7 3.0 6.2 7.1 9.1 7.2
4+ all 1,080 1,122 1,238 1,295 1,326 1,344
% giving 35.3 48.1 37.7 33.5 32.6 28.7
% giving equally 0.6 0.9 3.0 4.3 5.2 2.9
—, ±20%a 0.6 0.9 3.3 4.3 5.2 2.9
a Means: including allowing an absolute deviation of 20% from the intrafamily mean
Table 5: Parents’ net worth (1991 dollars).
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
total number 4,499 4,456 4,721 4,828 4,886 4,843
mean 221,763 240,869 249,037 272,994 315,808 304,046
giving number 1,662 2,228 1,969 1,739 1,730 1,550
mean 294,565 277,911 330,683 393,649 423,953 450,676
equal giving number 210 326 351 313 321 274
mean 344,122 340,822 469,669 633,360 588,364 834,085
Note. Weighted statistics. Net worth imputations from RANDHRS distribution.
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Table 6: Interval tobit
observed data regime interval yℓ yu f
uncensored [a,a] a . ϕ(y˜ℓ)
left-censored data (−∞,b] b . F(y˜ℓ)
right-censored data [a,∞) a . F(−y˜ℓ)
interval data [a,b] a b F(y˜u)−F(y˜ℓ)
we have repeated observations over time, indexed t. Observation time is equally
spaced (two years between sample waves).
Our model can be cast in terms of a latent variable formulation. This takes
into account the many zero-transfer cases. Let y⋆ be the latent variable of notional
transfers from parents to children and y the observed value which has a distribution
censored from below, say. The model can then be written as
y⋆hkt = x
′
hktβ + errorhkt . (1)
We consider tobit type models as opposed to selection models as the latter are not
semiparametrically identified, owing to the lack of exclusion restrictions implied
by theory. There is also nothing in the existing data that our intuition suggests
would be a suitable candidate to separate the intensive from the extensive transfer
margin.
Many parents are not able or not willing to give exact amounts on transfers per
children. In that case, the HRS questionnaire elicits amount information in pre-
specified intervals [a,b]. We can generalize the model to an interval-tobit model,
and specify the observed endogenous variable accordingly as a twin, yℓ and yu.
Denote the the standardized counterparts of yℓ and yu by y˜ℓ and y˜u and the likeli-
hood contribution for an observation by f . The latter depends on the observational
regime as outlined in Table 6.
Here, ϕ(·) denotes the (symmetric) density and F the corresponding cdf. If
either a →−∞ or b → +∞, brackets are open and the standard likelihood contri-
bution of the tobit obtains. The standard tobit would also apply when we relied on
imputed values for the continuous but partially observed observations.
The error in (1) has three components,
errorhkt = εhkt +αhk +ηh (2)
where εhkt is an idiosyncratic error term, αhk is a child-level effect, and ηh is
a family-level effect. This is the nested structure considered by, for instance,
Antweiler (2001) and Baltagi et al. (2001) for the linear model. Nesting means
that αhk are never shared between units h, but lie entirely within.
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Incorporating (2) into the structure of Table 6 and postulating a parametric
distribution for each of the components allows the model to be estimated by Max-
imum Likelihood. In the current application, we consider normal distributions for
all three levels for reasons of feasibility. The resulting log likelihood function, ex-
pressed in terms of joint densities of data and random effects, to be maximized is
then
lnLh = ln
[∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
Kh
∏
k=1
Thk
∏
t=1
fkt(y
ℓ
hkt ,y
u
hkt ,xhkt ,ηh,αhk;θ)dαhkdηh
]
(3)
where Kh is the number of children in family h, and Thk is the number of reports
available on child k by family h. The sample is unbalanced at both levels. θ
includes β and distributional parameters.
The model as it stands can be classified under the heading of generalized linear
latent model, which has recently become popular in many areas of applied research.
We specify the variance of the idiosyncratic error as a function of observables, so
as to take into account heteroskedasticity. In particular, we postulate
σhkt = c · exp(x
′
hktγ) (4)
which allows the idiosyncratic errors to be from a different distribution in a quite
flexible way. As is well known (see Arabmazar and Schmidt, 1982), slope param-
eters β in limited dependent variable models may not be consistently estimated
when heteroskedasticity is not taken into account.
To integrate out both levels of effects ηh and αhk, we approximate the inte-
gral inside the likelihood function by a sum over draws from the estimated effects
distribution (see Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994, for details of simulation methods
within the maximum likelihood context). We have
lnLh = ln
[
1
R
R
∑
r=1
1
S
S
∑
s=1
Kh
∏
k=1
Thk
∏
t=1
fkt(y
ℓ
hkt ,y
u
hkt ,xhkt ,η
r
h,α
s
hk;θ)
]
. (5)
The standard simulationMLmethodology relies on (pseudo-)random draws, which
has the disadvantage that possibly many Monte Carlo draws are needed in order to
accurately approximate the integral in question. In particular, with large data sets
such as ours, and the additional complication of a nested error structure, this con-
sideration becomes an issue. Recent statistical literature has turned to considering
quasi-random draws. These are deterministic choices of support points for a dis-
tribution, giving the advantage of much better coverage over the entire domain
of the distribution. See for instance Train (2003) for a discussion. This method-
ology has the big advantage that much fewer ‘draws’ are needed than standard
(pseudo-)random Monte Carlo methods. We rely on Halton sequences.
Since quasi-random numbers are deterministic, results establishing the asymp-
totic equivalence between the simulated ML and the ML estimator (Hajivassiliou
and Ruud, 1994) do not necessarily apply. To remedy this problem, we randomize
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the starting point of the Halton sequence, leading to what has become known as
randomized Halton sequence (Bhat, 2003).
The model so far can be dubbed hierarchical random effects generalized tobit as
it allows for a multi-level nested error structure. Mundlak (1978) showed the equiv-
alence of estimators of slope parameters under fixed effects and under the random
effects specification when augmented with time-averaged regressors in a standard,
linear panel data model with large N and small T . Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and
Wooldridge (2001) recommend the Mundlak strategy for nonlinear models. Since
our panels are families (at least in one dimension), we condition on average child
characteristics. This gives our estimates the interpretation of fixed family effects
estimates, while not giving up the time dimension.
Alternative, non- or semiparametric estimators that take into account the nested
levels are hard to conceive. For instance, Honore´ (1992) fixed effects tobit estima-
tor, which applies to a single effects structure, relies on first differencing within
the panel (say, within families). It, therefore, cannot estimate parameters on vari-
ables that are fixed within the panel (say, family characteristics). Applying fixed
effects to the inner structure would take differences among repeated observations
of the same child and lead to child-level fixed effects estimates. One would lose
the ability to condition on both variables that are fixed at child level over time and
variables that are fixed at family level over time.9 While we have considered dif-
ferencing at the child level, the resulting estimate would be uninformative for our
question of interest (within family variation of transfers). We shall below, however,
present Honore´ estimates for data that are aggregated per child, dropping the time
dimension.
Note that we divide all transfer amounts by 2 in waves where the question
referred to transfers in the previous two years, as opposed to the previous year (see
Subsection 3.2).
Permanent income is constructed from child-level observables and relies much
on education and age (flexible polynomial) and a number of other regressors. In so
doing, we follow the methodology applied elsewhere in the literature and described
in somewhat more detail in Kapteyn et al. (2005). In particular, permanent income
relies on a prediction from current annual log income and varies over the life-cycle
of an individual. Parents are very often not able to precisely state their children’s
household income, so that the interviewing method widely relies on bracket in-
formation. Our underlying income model is, therefore, similar to that of Table 6,
except that it only features a child-level effect, a prediction of which we also add
to the linearly predicted value. Given this prediction, we calculate income lev-
els, and subsequently the present value, discounted at 4 percent between waves.
Appendix C fills in on some details.
The data structure allows in principle to deliver large additional insights into
what drives transfer behavior. Recall that from our data section the questionnaire
allowed transfers to be reported both a gift and a loan. Intrafamily loans would be
9A similar remark applies to the approach outlined in Greene (2004).
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relevant in the context of liquidity constraints. So, equipped with a measure of liq-
uidity constraints at the individual child level, we could tell from the data whether
transfers are gifts or whether they should better be understood as loans. Liquidity
constraints at the child level are not directly observed, neither is consumption. We
could rely on Zeldes (1989) approach and split the sample according to asset levels.
We cannot observe net worth at the child level, however, only home ownership.
We rely on a different indicator. Recall that childrens’ household income is
measured as current income and that for many cases, only bracket information is
available. We introduce a dummy variable that flags those observations where per-
manent income is predicted to lie above the upper bracket value of current income
(or above current income if a continuous observation is available). This measure
will pick out some of those children whose current income falls short of permanent
income. We interpret it as a conservative indicator of liquidity constraints. If the
coefficient of that variable is estimated to be insignificantly different from zero,
we can give the data the interpretation that transfers are gifts, not loans. With the
present data we do not see scope for improving on this measure.
4.2 Results
Our main results refer to estimates from the hierarchical generalized tobit as out-
lined in Subsection 4.1. There are two levels of nested ‘random effects’, one at
the family level and one at the child level. At the family level we control for av-
erage children characteristics. In addition, we specify that the idiosyncratic error
variance be a function of observables to allow for heteroskedasticity, as in (4).
Estimating this model by Maximum Likelihood when the dependent variable is
measured in levels (dollar amounts) is very difficult, since convergence problems
are severe. Alternatively, we subject amounts to a nonlinear transformation in order
to take into account that the (conditional) distribution of the endogenous variable y
is strongly skewed. The transformation we apply is the so-called inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation (Burbidge et al., 1988), which is akin to the log transformation
but can instead also accommodate zeros of the original variable,
zhkt = sinh
−1(yhkt) = ln
(
yhkt +
√
y2hkt +1
)
. (6)
This transformation has been applied elsewhere in the literature on wealth and con-
sumption (see, for instance, Browning and Crossley, 2004; Pence, 2006). While not
exactly a log-transformation, in our data the approximation is sufficiently close so
that we shall interpret the coefficient estimates on the regressors as semi-elasticities.
In terms of regressors, we condition on many parental, and most child char-
acteristics that we can observe in the data. Child characteristics are reported by
the family respondent in the parent household. They include a set of standard de-
mographics (age, marital status, having any children), whether and how much the
child works, whether it owns a home. We also include our constructed regressors of
permanent income and the indicator of potential ‘liquidity constraints’. We exclude
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education from our transfer equation so as to have identification of the permanent
income effect.
We also observe whether the child lives in the vicinity of the reporting parent
(within 10 miles), and whether it is a child as opposed to a step-child of the current
family respondent and his or her spouse. We use the panel structure of the data and
lag the observations by one wave (2 years) for a number of regressors: labor supply,
marital status, having children, living close, owning a home, and potentially being
liquidity constrained.
Parental characteristics include demographics, as well as measures of wealth
and income. We use the number of children ever reported on by the household, as
opposed to the number of children currently reported on as indicator of household
size.
The sample underlying Table 7 deviates from the descriptive sample in a num-
ber of ways. We exclude families with children for whom we cannot necessarily
expect the economic models to apply: exclusion of families where any child in
any wave was born after 1974 (younger than 18 in 1992), results in 75,825 obser-
vations. Excluding any family where any of the children present in any year are
still living at home, leaves us with 36,828 observations. Excluding those families
where any child in any wave is still ‘at school’ leaves a sample of 19,935 obser-
vations. We then exclude any family that is not intact at the parent level over the
entire observation period and any family that is not intact at the child-level.10 We
then select families with at least two children. We shall explore the sensitivity to
various sample exclusions in Subsection 4.3.
Due to lagging some of the regressors once and further occurrence of missing
values, the sample for Table 7 contains a total of 10,831 observations, representing
2,231 children from 735 different families. There are at most 44 observations for
any of the families (children-wave observations).
Estimation proceeds by maximizing the simulated likelihood function (5) via a
Newton Raphson minimizer.11 The number of Halton draws is a choice parameter
for us. We use 100 Halton numbers per observation, both at the parental and the
child level. Bhat (2003) and Train (2003) report that 100 Halton numbers per
observation yield accurate approximations to the true likelihood function. For the
models in amount levels, which is a lot harder to estimate, we rely on 35 draws,
after initial trials that suggested these numbers to be a good compromise between
computational burden and numerical stability.12
The table contains two sets of coefficient estimates and associated standard
10We flag those families where a change in family composition took place during the observation
period. Examples are at the parent level death, divorce or marriage, and at the child level incomplete
mentions over the years or births or deaths. We classify families as being intact if at the parent level
there is no recorded change in family status, due to death, remarrying or repartnering, and if at the
child level no new children are added to the household.
11We coded our model in Fortran and rely on routine E04KDF of the NAG Fortran libraries.
12The log likelihood value, parameter estimates and standard errors are not much affected in the
specifications with transformed endogenous variable when chosing this lower number of draws.
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errors.13 The left panel refers to the specification using the inverse hyperbolic
sine transform of the endogenous variable, the right panel refers to estimates of
the model in levels. Some, but not all, of the parameter estimates deserve short
comments. We start by discussing the left panel.
Model with nonlinearly transformed endogenous variable. Children’s age is
not important in determining the amount received, perhaps owing to the fact that all
of them are adults outside the parental home, earning their own incomes. Gender,
however, seems to play a role, sons receive less than daughters. Age and gender
will also enter indirectly via the permanent income variable, however. Education
is excluded as a direct regressor but enters via permanent income. Children of
both main respondent and (if present) his or her spouse receive significantly more
money than stepchildren.
Working hours two years ago do not have any significant effects on transfers.
The coefficient for married children is not significant, one possible explanation
is that there may exist a second donor-couple (in-laws). Children with children
of their own clearly receive more. On the other hand, physical vicinity does not
appear to be important in this regression. Homeowners receive significantly less.
The parameter of prime interest is the coefficient on the permanent income
variable, which is negative and highly significant. Note that permanent income is
allowed to vary with age and will, therefore, change over time. The interpretation
of that coefficient is similar to a semielasticity, to the extent that our transformation
is close enough to the natural logarithm. It thus means that a decrease of permanent
income by one dollar (in real terms, base 1991) triggers an increase of the gift
amount by 0.003 percent. We can translate this into an absolute change, which
depends on the initial gift amount. A child who initially receives 500 dollars,
which is close to the unconditional mean, would receive slightly less than 2 cents
more for a 1 dollar reduction of permanent income. The conditional mean for the
gift amount is around 2,500 dollars. A child who initially receives this amount
would receive about 8 cents more for a 1 dollar reduction of permanent income.
Recall that we have conditioned on average child characteristics, allowing us
to interpret the coefficients as in a family fixed effects regression. Therefore, our
estimate suggests that it is the difference between the siblings’ permanent income,
conditional on the intrafamily mean, that drives transfer behavior at the individual
level. Parents observe their children’s permanent income and reallocate resources
towards equalization of differences. These compensatory inter vivos transfers are
consistent with altruism. Clearly, the magnitudes involved suggest that full equal-
ization is far from being achieved. This implies that the derivative condition is not
fulfilled, see Appendix D.
In addition, our (conservative) proxy for liquidity constraints does not suggest
that transfer behavior is driven by overcoming temporary financial strains, as the
13A number of parameters estimated along with those in the table has been suppressed for brevity.
These include within-family average child characteristics and the specification of σ according to (4).
These estimates are available from us on request.
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Table 7: Regression results, main specification, model Table 6
transformation of dep. var.: sinh−1 levels
Regressor name estimate standard estimate standard
error error
children’s characteristics
age -0.055 0.086 -14.9 29.1
male -1.179 0.567∗∗ -493.7 182.6∗∗
biological 4.341 1.337∗∗ 1,696.0 444.2∗∗
works ≥ 30 hourst−1 -1.017 0.643 -229.6 170.2
works < 30 hourst−1 -0.103 0.882 -195.8 241.2
marriedt−1 -0.768 0.613 -235.5 153.1
has childrent−1 2.562 0.674
∗∗ 566.9 172.5∗∗
≤ 10m from parentt−1 0.380 0.515 137.0 140.9
owns homet−1 -3.707 0.575
∗∗ -1,300.7 191.7∗∗
permanent income (10k$) -0.313 0.062∗∗ -157.0 25.2∗∗
‘liquidity constrained’t−1 0.330 1.588 5.1 495.5
within-family averages on request on request
parent household characteristics
age 0.094 0.119 -48.5 40.3
education 0.672 0.179∗∗ 130.6 59.4∗∗
male -0.136 1.725 644.0 532.2
race: black -2.117 1.723 -1,151.6 398.4∗∗
race: other -4.298 3.918 -1,654.7 1,197.5
ethnicity: hispanic -2.301 3.297 -1,105.2 892.2
US born -5.116 1.332∗∗ -1,651.6 521.2∗∗
household incomet−1 (10k$) 0.078 0.031
∗∗ 41.0 21.5∗
household net wortht−1 (10k$) 0.015 0.005
∗∗ 3.7 2.5
subjective healtht−1 fair 0.970 1.435 146.3 337.0
good 1.602 1.415 650.1 359.4∗
very good 0.995 1.417 338.4 369.3
excellent 0.690 1.465 252.7 393.5
3 children -4.021 0.893∗∗ -1,012.6 296.6∗∗
4 -8.914 1.168∗∗ -4,039.7 512.8∗∗
5 -5.519 1.244∗∗ -2,374.2 388.9∗∗
6 -4.332 1.554∗∗ 76.8 565.3
7 or more -7.737 2.252∗∗ -3,262.8 773.1∗∗
constants
intercept -14.622 6.039∗∗ -1,809.1 2,191.2
wave 1996 0.150 0.603 1,115.5 232.3∗∗
wave 1998 -2.147 0.746∗∗ 715.4 271.3∗∗
wave 2000 -1.990 0.887∗∗ -229.0 367.9
wave 2002 -2.262 1.037∗∗ 616.7 389.9
ln(σα ) 1.073 0.093
∗∗ 6.545 0.175∗∗
ln(ση ) 1.927 0.047
∗∗ 7.847 0.050∗∗
ln(σ) = x′γ on request on request
log-likelihood -8,435.53 -16,767.86
Note: Number of observations: N = 10,831, H = 735, K = 2,231
Numerical integration is based on 100 randomized Halton draws for the transformed model
and 35 draws for the levels model. ∗ and ∗∗ flag values significantly
different from 0 at 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
σα and ση refer to child and family level random effects, respectively
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coefficient on the respective variable is not significantly different from zero. Thus,
our data can be meaningfully exploited in order to tell something about whether the
transfers are gifts or temporary help. Resource flows are not only compensatory
temporary smoothers but compensatory inter vivos gifts. Whereas the literature
has speculated for a long time about the true nature of observed transfers,14 our
analysis is the first that uses the two dimensions of the panel (time and children) to
identify the relevant channel. This is a main contribution of this paper.
The child level random effect (nested within the family level), is an important
empirical contribution to the model. We estimate the log of its standard deviation
to be 1.073 with a standard error of 0.09.
Among the family level variables we include the family respondent’s demo-
graphics, race, income, assets, and subjective health evaluation (measured in five
categories, ranging from excellent to poor). Parents that are higher educated give
more, parents born abroad likewise give more, as do those with higher wealth. The
coefficient on (lagged) household income (measured in 10,000$) is 0.078. Health
appears to be unimportant in the decision to give to any particular child.
Conditioning on the number of children in the family shows that the higher the
number of siblings, the lower the amount that a particular child will receive. The
impact is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. An interpretation of the negative sign may
have to do simply with the parental budget constraint.
We include time dummies to clean out wave-specific idiosyncrasies (measure-
ment issues in the dependent variable and shocks to the regressors). We have also
considered regional dummies, but found them to be not significant in preliminary
runs, so we exclude them for parsimony.
Again, we estimate the log of the standard deviation of the family level effect
to be large (1.927) and very strongly significant (standard error 0.05).
The validity of the Maximum Likelihood estimates displayed in Table 7 hinges
upon the correct specification of the error distribution. Heteroskedasticity is one
main concern, but is already accounted for in the displayed estimates to the extent
that (4) is correctly specified. A Wald test clearly rejects the null of homoskedas-
ticity with a test statistic of 101.6 at 33 degrees of freedom in the model under
transformation (6), and even more clearly does so for the levels model.
Levels model. The right panel of the table shows estimation results of our
model in levels, rather than under the transformation (6). While theoretically more
appealing, it is computationally a lot more cumbersome. In addition, a Vuong
(1989) asymptotic test for nonnested models selects the specification with non-
linearly transformed endogenous variable.15 We thus chose not to use the levels
specification as our point of departure for the sensitivity analysis to be reported
in Subsection 4.3. The effect of raising the child’s permanent income by one dol-
14See, for example, Laferre`re and Wolff (2006), section 6, and Arrondel and Masson (2006),
section 4.
15Standard normal test statistic of 18.2. For this, we adjust the likelihood function with a Jacobian
term for the model with transformed endogenous variable, resulting in a log likelihood value of
-11,344.3. This term is not incorporated in the values shown in the Tables.
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lar equals 1.6 cents lower gifts in this specification, this is similar to the effect in
the nonlinear specification when evaluated at the unconditional mean of the gift
amount. Note, that due to computational reasons we use a smaller set of covariates
in the specification of (4).
There is no difference between the level specification and the nonlinear trans-
formation in the sense that liquidity constraints do not appear to matter. The coeffi-
cient estimates vary widely between specifications, however. The effect of lagged
household income on transfers equals 0.4 cent per dollar.
Honore´ model. As an alternative, we consider Honore´ (1992) semiparametric
estimators that are based on first-differencing two observations of a panel with two
measurements to remove fixed effects. Two important strengths of the approach
are that it allows for some general form heteroskedasticity and does not specify a
functional form for the error distribution. In our context, our data has two dimen-
sions (family and children) and we can take differences between two children of a
family or between two repeated measurements for a child. The latter would remove
both fixed family effects and fixed child effects, and not allow us to display esti-
mates on variables that vary between children but are constant over time. Resulting
parameter estimates are extremely noisy.
Instead, we apply the estimator to the following data structure: we take regres-
sor values in the first wave of the survey (1992) and use as endogenous variable the
average transfer amounts reported in subsequent surveys (1994–2002). We thus
use one observation per child.
We use the estimator for censored observations that is based on a smooth con-
ditional moment condition. Since our sample includes families with more than two
children (unbalanced panel data set), we can estimate the model for all perceivable
pairwise combinations of children within a family. To form pairwise combinations
of children, we first order children by age.
We obtain a set of estimates which will differ numerically, but we can impose
over-identifying restrictions using a minimum distance criterion to obtain a single
estimator. The convergence of the estimator is sensitive to the amount of censor-
ing. We had to disregard all pairwise combinations of children where more than
90 percent of the observations were censored (no gifts). Also, we disregard all
combinations of children comprising less than 100 families in order to have identi-
fication. We finally disregard all those estimates where the covariance matrix was
singular.
Results are in Table 8. We cannot control for any family-level variables as
they would be removed by the differencing. In addition, we drop the measure
of liquidity constraints from consideration since we shifted focus away from the
longitudinal dimension of our data.
Whereas the estimates in Table 8 are from a different model, the point estimates
do tell a similar story as those in Table 7, and are perhaps surprisingly close, in
particular the coefficient on permanent income. Some of the other coefficients are
quite different, however. We see the largest deviations in the level specifications,
perhaps owing to misspecification.
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Table 8: Regression results, fixed effects tobit, Honore´ (1992)
transformation of dep. var.: sinh−1 levels
Regressor name estimate standard estimate standard
error error
children’s characteristics
age 0.020 0.045 16.4 21.2
male 0.220 0.253 518.7 91.2∗∗
biological 1.836 0.645∗∗ 56.7 226.4
works ≥ 30 hours -0.491 0.365 -1,059.3 202.8∗∗
works < 30 hours -0.044 0.546 -627.8 224.2∗∗
married -0.936 0.274∗∗ 502.6 104.3∗∗
has children 1.215 0.291∗∗ 154.5 110.9
≤ 10m from parent 0.801 0.260∗∗ 119.9 108.2
owns home -0.617 0.281∗∗ -344.8 126.7∗∗
permanent income (10k$) -0.402 0.069∗∗ -61.7 29.6∗∗
Note: number of observations: N = 2,178, H = 729, K = 2,178
The results reported Table 8 suggest that an average child will receive a 0.6
cent compensation for a one dollar difference in permanent income compared to
a sibling (levels model), or that a 10,000 dollar lead in permanent income over
a sibling will result in a 40 percent lower parental transfer (transformed model).
These numbers are far from the alleged 1-on-1 compensation needed to support
the conclusion of altruistic behavior.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Table 9 presents results obtained by deviating from our preferred specification (the
left panel of Table 7). The table only shows the coefficients on child permanent in-
come and our ‘liquidity constraints’ indicator, as well as on parents’ household in-
come. Given computational burden and the low performance in sensitivity checks,
we disregard the levels specification from now on.
A first check relates to heteroskedasticity. While the Wald test reported earlier
rejects a constant in favor of (4), a homoskedastic specification leads to inconsistent
estimates. Reestimating, we find that the coefficient of child permanent income
more than halves. Conclusions as to the other two main coefficients are largely
unaffected, however. A likelihood ratio test confirms the conclusion from the Wald
test.
Second, we can similarly test whether conditioning on within-family average
child regressors is a contribution to the model. While neither the Wald test from
specification of Table 7 nor an LR test (test statistics each of 18.0 at 11 degrees of
freedom), reject the null, the coefficient estimate of interest is attenuated, compared
to the baseline.
Third, we want to explore the sensitivity to using imputed values rather than
nonimputed values. The imputation is based on simple draws from the observed
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Table 9: Regression results, deviations from baseline
specification child ‘liquidity parent N H K log
permanent constrained’ household likeli-
income income hood
baseline, Table (7) -0.313 0.330 0.078 10,831 735 2,231 -8,435.5
(0.062) (1.588) (0.031)
baseline, homoskedastic -0.140 -0.440 0.078 10,831 735 2,231 -8,481.3
(0.039) (1.548) (0.029)
random family effects -0.246 0.013 0.082 10,831 735 2,231 -8,444.5
(0.056) (1.577) (0.031)
tobit instead of -0.316 0.197 0.084 10,831 735 2,231 -8,698.1⋆
interval model (0.061) (1.580) (0.029)
(multiply imputed)
non-intact families -0.333 1.018 0.078 14,046 995 3,099 -10,887.9
dummied rather (0.054) (1.509) (0.029)
than excluded
first three waves only -0.751 -0.646 0.198 6,523 1,056 3,330 -5,818.0
(0.108) (1.642) (0.034)
children at home and at -0.409 -0.212 0.066 58,033 4,210 14,186 -44,490.7
school individually (0.033) (0.876) (0.012)
excluded, not the
entire family
including one-child -0.354 1.319 0.102 11,431 864 2,360 -9,248.7
families (0.060) (1.229) (0.026)
Notes: standard errors in parentheses, ⋆ averaged over estimates obtained from 5 imputes
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continuous distribution, taking into account the bracket information, and is in this
sense nonparametric (hot deck). Since imputed values reduce the number of ob-
servational regimes to two (zeroes and continuous observations), we can use a
simpler, traditional tobit set-up instead of the generalization in Table 6. We use
multiple imputation techniques in order to take into account the imputation error,
and a conventional number of five imputes (Rubin and Schenker, 1986). The table
reveals coefficient estimates and standard errors that are very similar to those of
the baseline specification. There is no large impact of assuming normality for the
within-bracket distribution. We prefer the baseline for computational reasons.
Fourth, we investigate what difference it makes to flag households that change
over time (anywhere in the observation period), rather than excluding them alto-
gether. We use two dummy variables, one for the family level, one for the child
level. This increases the sample to 14,046 observations (3,099 children in 995 fam-
ilies). The other sample restrictions still apply. The resulting estimates of child’s
permanent income as well as that of parental income are very close to those of
the baseline. However, it appears that the dummy proxying for potential liquidity
constraints increases in magnitude (but stays insignificant).
Fifth, we assess the importance of the time horizon by reestimating and ignor-
ing any information beyond wave 3 of the survey. (Note that permanent income
is still based on all six waves.) Doing this may make it less likely that a family is
subjected to our sample exclusion restrictions. This may change sample composi-
tion, and it may to a lesser extent capture long-run giving behavior. The effective
sample has 6,523 observations on 3,330 children in 1,056 families. While we do
not see any effect of liquidity constraints, the magnitude of the permanent income
derivative is much larger than in the shorter sample (coefficient of -0.751). We also
see a much larger effect of parent household income on gifts.
Sixth, instead of casting away entire families where at least one child is ei-
ther at home or at school during the observation period of six waves, we instead
exclude only those observations from a child that is at home or at school. This
increases the sample substantially to 14,186 children in 4,210 families, yielding
58,033 observations. The effects on the coefficients of interest are minor.
Seventh, the model as such can technically be estimated on a sample of parents
with a single child. This increases the sample by another 129 families and children.
The impact on the coefficient of child permanent income is minor, as is the impact
on the coefficient of parent household income.
5 Conclusion
Parents’ transfer motives are important for understanding, e.g., macroeconomics,
income (re)distribution, savings, and public finance. In this paper we use data from
six biennial waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 1992–2002 to study
parents’ transfers to their children. The HRS is an excellent data set to study ques-
tions addressed in our paper. The coverage of the pre-retirement cohort includes
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those who have accumulated substantial wealth from life cycle savings. They are,
therefore, in a position where they can afford to give away money. Moreover,
as they are about to retire within the foreseeable future, they make conscious deci-
sions about how to use the accumulated resources. Possibly even more importantly,
the HRS contains information on two generations of the same family, parents and
children.
Three fourths of all families give something to at least some of their children.
Conditional on giving at all, we find that only 2 percent of parents in the HRS
divide their gifts equally among their children. Equal sharing is decreasing in the
number of children but increasing in the wealth of parents.
The predictions of the transfer theories are predictions of the within-family-
variation in transfer behavior, not the between-family-variation. Data, therefore,
need to have a family dimension and a sibling dimension. In addition, data need
a time dimension to be used to test whether transfers are gifts or temporary help.
We estimate grouped tobit-type latent variable models with multi-level error com-
ponents. We specify the unobservables to fall into three categories: a random
error term, varying over families, children, and time; a child-level specific error
component, varying over children and constant over time; a family-specific error
component, varying over families and constant for all children in the family (and
constant over time).
Our main findings are as follows:
1. We find that intergenerational transfers flowing from parents to children are
inter vivos gifts, not temporary help to overcome liquidity constraints.
2. Gift amounts from parents are compensatory in the sense that life-time poorer
children will receive higher transfers than their life-time richer siblings.
3. We do not find, however, that gifts make up the entire difference in life-time
resources. One dollar less of life-time income compared to a sibling triggers
about 2 cents of expected (unconstrained) inter vivos gifts (levels model)
or an increase by 0.003 percent (semielasticity in a nonlinearly transformed
model).
The sensitivity analysis shows that these findings are robust to variations in
model specifications and samples. Our parametric approach gives similar results
to the semiparametric approach proposed by Honore´ (1992) on a one-way model.
The empirical result that transfers are compensatory is consistent with the
predictions of the altruistic model of intergenerational transfers. Parents do not,
however, seem to completely equalize income differences between siblings as pre-
dicted. But there is also evidence that can be interpreted as consistent with the
predictions of the exchange model of intergenerational transfers. For instance,
daughters get more than sons which might have an exchange explanation. Liv-
ing close to the parents does not matter for gifts in some specifications, however,
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which might have been expected in an exchange framework. The general conclu-
sion is, therefore, that there is not just a single theory of transfers that is uniformly
supported by the data.
There is no support, however, for the egoistic model as we do find that transfers
are compensatory. The risk-sharing hypothesis does not receive support either as
transfers do not seem to be temporary help.
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A Data
A.1 Introduction
We use data from the core HRS cohort of the HRS and from the RANDHRS dis-
tribution of the same data. All data is available online via the University of Michi-
gan’s Institute for Social Research web site. This website has last been accessed
for checking ‘data alerts’ and possible download of data on November 11, 2005.
The data is a panel data set with biennual sampling and contains information
on households where at least one respondent was born in between the years 1931
and 1941. These people are followed over time in subsequent interviews. There
is no refreshment sampling for respondents that drop out. Respondents leave the
sample due to death or due to refusal to participate. The survey was started in 1992,
and we use six waves through 2002 (final release versions).
We disregard ‘exit’ interviews, i.e., interviews conducted with a proxy respon-
dent eliciting information on former respondents that have died since their previ-
ous interview. Some crucial variables have been imputed by HRS staff and (single)
imputations are distributed in imputation files. Whereas imputations on incomes,
wealth, and transfers to children are of interest, we rely on own mulitple imputa-
tions for transfers, and on income and wealth imputations from RANDHRS files.
To link data across time for the same respondents, ‘tracker’ files are provided in the
main distribution. These tracker files come in two versions: one respondent level
file, and one ‘other person’ level distribution, LOPN.
The data are suitable to estimate economic models based on observed behavior
of intrafamily monetary transfers. For this, we need information on a parental
household and their children. The information needed consists of
1. identifiers for all households, parents and children in the family, consistent
over time
2. individual characteristics of parents and children
3. indicators of whether or not transfers were made between parents and chil-
dren in a given wave
4. amounts of transfers made in a given year
Household composition changes over time and we want to minimize as far
as possible measurement problems that are due to information being reported from
different sources. The data distribution consists of hundreds of data files with infor-
mation at different levels of aggregation. We, therefore, need identifiers that con-
sistently allow us to track which information on what child was reported by whom.
Building a data set suitable for analysis, including a number of consistency checks
and imputation of missing values on crucial variables is not a straightforward exer-
cise. A document giving some more detail on procedures applied is available from
the authors on request.
29
A.2 Identifiers
There are various levels of identifiers in the data, information on which is taken
from the two tracker files (respondent and other-person tracker files):
1. A set of household identifiers, HHID xSUBHH. xSUBHH is a wave-specific
sub-household identifier for wave x, and becomes relevant when an existing
household splits in two. All sub-households emerging from original house-
holds HHID are in principle followed up.
2. A person-level identifier, typically a respondent’s person number, PN, within
the household, or, a ‘longitudinal other person number’, LOPN. LOPN identi-
fies non-respondents (such as children).
3. We constructed an additional identifier from available information in the data
to associate the report of a particular parent (family respondent) to a particu-
lar child (nonrespondent), FAMSTORY, used for merging data sets of parental
level information with those of child level information.
An observation in our analysis will be uniquely identified by HHID LOPN
FAMSTORY wave where wave identifies the survey wave. Using the FAMSTORY
linker effectively lets us abandon the xSUBHH identifier.
A.3 Data extraction and main changes to data
Data preparation involves a number of steps, which we briefly describe.
Parent-level identifiers and definition of intact households
We collect basic fixed characteristics of respondent and spouse, including their
relationship (i.e., which person to match with whom at what wave) from the main
tracker file. We use this information on respondent level to assess whether or not
household composition has changed over time. This gives rise to various possible
definitions on whether a household is ‘intact’.
The definition we employ is based on the following: a household is ‘intact’
either if it contains only one respondent over time, or if it contains two respondents
who are and stay a couple. Not intact, according to this definition, are couples
that split into sub-households, households where a new partner enters, or where a
partner dies.
We also determine person-level identifiers for family and financial respondents.
Children-level story indicators
All information on nonrespondents (children) stems from respondents (parents). In
case an original household splits, subsequent information on children may be sup-
plied by all split off sub-households, giving rise to multiple ‘stories’ about the same
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child.16 While the HRS distribution contains an identifier linking sub-households
and children and identifying such ‘stories’, there may be remaining variation in
terms of child information within a given ‘story’ when the identity of the family
respondent changes within a subhousehold over time. To remedy this, we create the
additional linker, FAMSTORY, mentioned above. FAMSTORY keeps the PN/LOPN as-
sociation constant over time and, therefore, identifies within HHID LOPN the source
of the information given. We exclude all observations from further analysis where
respondents report on children that do not receive a LOPN identifier or where no
link between family respondent and child could be established.
Select family respondent and determine relationship with child
We fix the identity of a family or financial respondent for our purposes, to avoid
changes in parental characteristics over time (so, the actual family respondent may
change in the data, but we instead use the characteristics of a fixed person and
refer to that person henceforth as the family respondent). The family respondent is
typically that of the first wave, and will be substituted with some other respondent
if not available in the first wave.
Child-level nonrespondents may or may not be children of at least one of the
main respondents. We clean up inconsistencies between waves due to different
wordings of identifying questions between waves, and fill in gaps. Where inter-
viewees are being presented with data from previous interviews, the more recent
information may be more accurate and serve as an update. We determine the re-
lationship between child-level nonrespondents and respondents and subsequently
exclude those from consideration that are not a child of either family respondent or
the spouse (for instance, grandchildren or children in-law).
Definition of children-intact sub-households
The number of children mentioned by a given sub-household can change by either
children not mentioned before ‘entering’ or children mentioned before not being
mentioned anymore. There are very few occasions where a child is born into a
household or dies between waves. It is more likely that a new spouse entering the
household also has children of his or her own.
This requires to define whether a sub-household is intact at the child level
and information on parent/subhousehold level. We define as intact between waves
at the child level those sub-households whose composition is unchanged at child
level.
16Suppose there are initially two respondents in a household, and the household splits in two after
the first wave, then both subhouseholds may have their own family respondent who delivers a ‘story’
on the child (or other person) in question.
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Parental characteristics
Respondent-level characteristics are from three types of sources. Characteristics
can refer to a particular respondent or to the entire (sub-)household. Fixed char-
acteristics, such as age, sex, education etc., plus some other background charac-
teristics, originate from the Tracker file. Health, income and wealth information is
from wave-specific files.
Since both income and wealth are composites of a variety of sources, on which
missing values tend to aggregate, we rely on imputed aggregates. For consis-
tency reasons, we use the regression-based RANDHRS (version E) imputations
on household incomes and assets.
Transfers to children
We extract information on whether and how much money was transferred to each
child. From wave 1996 on, transfers could be mentioned in the form of ‘same
amount to all my children/grandchildren’. We impute in those cases the relevant
amount to each child based on the full set of children of the respondent. Many
amounts are only given in brackets (if at all), and we impute missing values our-
selves (hotdeck conditional on bracket information) to iron out inconsistencies in
available HRS imputations and to have multiple imputations available.
Child characteristics
We clean and impute demographics and background characteristics for children
across waves. Not all variables were elicited for each child in each wave, in which
case missing values need to be filled in. In addition, there are recall errors or other
types of response errors that lead a certain respondent to characterize their children
differently over time even in terms of fixed characteristics (such as sex and year of
birth). We correct ‘errors’ as far as possible and reasonable, yielding sex and year
of birth information that does not change over time for a given child. Education
is made to be nondecreasing over time, and having children in two non-adjacent
waves but not in a wave in between is also interpreted as error (we do otherwise
allow for children of a child to die or to be born, though). Other characteristics,
such as whether or not a child attends school, stays at home, works, or its income,
are not updated.
Monetary values
All monetary values relating to wealth, income, and transfers, have been converted
into 1991 dollars using the ‘All Urban Consumers’ Consumer Price Index as pub-
lished on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website (series ID : CUUR0000SA0), re-
based where necessary. Monetary flow variables are, when necessary, transformed
to 12 month frequencies.
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Table 10: Sample statistics 1992, children.
individual children: family means:
variable mean SD min max mean SD min max
gifts received .159 .210 .322 0 1
gift amount, 1991 $ 507 2,367 0 80,000 799 2,955 0 80,000
permanent income, 1991 k$ 40.91 39.85 1.85 1,521.1 41.88 28.71 3.39 535.40
does not work .247 .236 .298 0 1
works < 30 hours per week .091 .098 .197 0 1
works ≥ 30 hours per week .662 .667 .330 0 1
homeowner .363 .373 .348 0 1
biological child .844 .878 .281 0 1
male .511 .515 .312 0 1
grandchildren .536 .482 .362 0 1
married .509 .499 .353 0 1
lives < 10 miles from parents .527 .536 .367 0 1
age 29.0 7.07 0 60 28.57 5.85 0 54.7
years of education 12.6 2.60 0 17 12.99 2.14 0 17
lives at home .198 .216 .310 0 1
goes to school .171 .191 .295 0 1
chg. in fam. comp. 1992 – 1994 .067 .068 .251 0 1
chg. in fam. comp. 1994 – 1996 .092 .073 .259 0 1
chg. in fam. comp. 1996 – 1998 .088 .065 .246 0 1
chg. in fam. comp. 1998 – 2000 .067 .049 .216 0 1
chg. in fam. comp. 2000 – 2002 .118 .086 .280 0 1
Note: weighted sample; based on 15,795 children in 4,499 families; different variables have different
numbers of missing values; family means are sample averages over children within the same family;
statistics refer to the 1992 wave (except changes between waves indicators)
B Sample statistics
The weighted sample statistics for the children can be found Table 10. The columns
to the left report sample statistics for the individuals while the columns to the right
concern the sample statistics of the means of the children in each family. Table
11 reports the weighted sample statistics for parents. In case of two-parent house-
holds, the characteristics are for the family respondent. Exceptions are net worth
and income which refer to both spouses.
Table 12 shows dollar amounts given by parents to all their children, aggregated
over all sample waves. These amounts decrease in the number of children. Parents
who share equally give more than other parents.
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Table 11: Sample statistics 1992, parents.
family respondent:
variable mean SD min max
gifts made .369 .483
gift amount, 1991 $ 1,780 5,417 0 160,000
net worth, 1991 1,000 $ 199,495 399,903 -319,000 6,202,000
income, 1991 1,000 $ 45,510 47,628 0 1,010,000
number of children 3.51 1.98 1 19
male family respondent .064
health, poor .064
health, fair .135
health, good .264
health, very good .299
health, excellent .239
age 54.2 5.15 27 72
years of education 12.1 3.97 0 17
Caucasian .796
African American .172
other non–Caucasian .033
Hispanic .083
chg. in fam. comp. 1992 – 1994 .032
chg. in fam. comp. 1994 – 1996 .049
chg. in fam. comp. 1996 – 1998 .059
chg. in fam. comp. 1998 – 2000 .054
chg. in fam. comp. 2000 – 2002 .067
Note: as in Table 10.
Table 12: Aggregate amounts given.
number of number of number of
children families amount: families amount:
giving family mean family SD giving family mean family SD
equally
1 538 9,824 23,124 — — —
2 1,361 8,447 21,844 63 22,702 38,766
3 1,155 4,715 9,599 21 7,871 9,737
4 873 3,343 6,961 9 12,458 25,836
> 4 1,283 1,868 5,520 8 5,352 3,647
Note. Weighted statistics.
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C Permanent income
Our measure of children’s permanent income is based on a random effects model
that regresses current log income (in 1991 dollars) on a number of observables. We
include as regressors linear splines in age and education, an age/education interac-
tion, sex, and the child’s race and ethnicity derived from both parent’s race and
ethnicity. Also, time (wave) dummies are included. We follow the methodology
set out in Kapteyn et al. (2005) which calculates a time-varying measure of perma-
nent income from a regression of log current income on observables. Unlike these
authors, we do not take into account cohort effects.
The measure of current income differs across survey waves. In the 1992 wave,
only qualitative information is available, that is, we know if the child’s annual
(nominal) family income fell short of 10,000 dollars, exceeded 25,000 dollars, or
fell in between. In the 1994 wave, parents are actually requested to supply an
estimate of the amount of children’s incomes, and if they were unable to do this,
they were presented with a range card and asked to indicate an appropriate bracket
with threshold values of 10,000, 25,000, and 40,000 dollars, respectively. In 1996
and in subsequent waves, child income was elicited in a similar manner, except that
the income thresholds were 10,000, 35,000, 50,000, and 100,000, and that brackets
were elicited subsequently (unfolding bracket technique).
The regression model used takes this heterogeneous information into account
in that it allows for continuous, discrete, and bracketed values in the endogenous
variable; hence, the model is a generalized censored regression model, much as
that of Table 6. It includes a composite error that has an individual specific random
effect and an idiosyncratic error.
The model was estimated in the same way and with the same software as the
two-level model for transfers. We add an estimate of the random effect to our pre-
dicted current income before calculating permanent income. This estimate, condi-
tional on data and estimated parameters, obtains from the likelihood contribution
as
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. (7)
Having obtained the linear prediction, we convert log income to levels, and cal-
culate permanent income by assuming a working life span ranging from 18 to 65.
We discount future incomes at 4% per year. The resulting estimate of (annualized)
permanent income is then obtained, and we discard a handful of observations with
negative values and those with permanent income of more than $2m annual.
We have convinced ourselves that changes in specification and assumed interest
rate in the calculation of permanent income do not reverse our conclusions from
the main estimates presented.
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D The derivative condition in fixed family effects models
Theory predicts that an altruistic parent will equalize the consumption possibilities
of her children and choose:
Gi−G j =−(Y
c
i −Y
c
j ) i, j = 1 . . .n, j 6= i. (8)
where Gi is the gift to child i, Y
c
i is the income of child i, G j is the gift to child
j, Y cj is the income of child j, and n is the number of siblings. The consumption
possibilities will then be the same for all children. The derivative of (8) is:
d(Gi−G j)
d(Y ci −Y
c
j )
=−1 i, j = 1 . . .n, j 6= i. (9)
Suppose that (8) holds. The separate derivatives of the difference in gifts with
respect to the two incomes are:
d(Gi−G j)
dY ci
=
∂Gi
∂Y ci
−
∂G j
∂Y ci
=−1
d(Gi−G j)
dY cj
=
∂Gi
∂Y cj
−
∂G j
∂Y cj
= 1.
Rearranging the difference between these derivatives somewhat gives:
∂Gi
∂Y ci
−
∂Gi
∂Y cj
+
∂G j
∂Y cj
−
∂G j
∂Y ci
=−2.
Symmetry between children requires equal treatment which implies:
∂Gi
∂Y ci
−
∂Gi
∂Y cj
=
∂G j
∂Y cj
−
∂G j
∂Y ci
=−1. (10)
This is the derivative condition. In other words, the derivative condition (10) is
equivalent to the consumption possibilities derivative (9).
For the empirical analysis this implies that testing (9) is equivalent to testing
(10). Suppose that the econometric specification includes fixed family effects. We
will then for family h have that
Gˆhi− Gˆh j = . . . βˆ
within
Y c (Y
c
hi−Y
c
h j) . . . i, j = 1 . . .n, j 6= i. (11)
If the outcome of the test is that we can reject that βwithinY c = −1, the derivative
condition (10) is also rejected.
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